Resumen

TILLERIA AQUEVEQUE, Leopoldo Edgardo. Jerry Fodor's Philosophy of Mind. Sophia [online]. 2021, n.30, pp.155-177. ISSN 1390-8626.  https://doi.org/10.17163/soph.n30.2021.05.

The article presents an approach to the philosophy of mind of Jerry Fodor, and focuses on the problem that his thesis on computational naturalism represents. It emphasizes the ontological differences between the modular input systems and the central systems of this mental machine. Through a review of the main criticisms of the Fodorian program, it is concluded with the idea that its conceptual innateness turns out to be its greatest epistemological problem and, paradoxically, its greatest philosophical contribution, especially due to the incorporation of the notion of common sense in the field of informational semantics. Fodor’s computational theory of mind seems to be an undeniable contribution to current models of cognitive science, particularly considering his idea of ​​informational encapsulation. Likewise, the notions of semantic and referential semantic memory, and their possible implications in the domain of Artificial Intelligence, currently constitute an important legacy of the works of the American philosopher. His suggestive observation that there is no such thing as constitutive conceptual truths seems to tip the board toward conceptual intuitionism for now. As long as something more substantive is not evident, the marriage between common sense and belief system, turns out to be the greatest philosophical triumph of ‘Citizen Fodor’.

Palabras clave : Science; cognition; philosophy; information; mind; psychology.

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