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Sophia, Colección de Filosofía de la Educación

versión On-line ISSN 1390-8626versión impresa ISSN 1390-3861

Resumen

CHAVES-MONTERO, Alfonso  y  GADEA AIELLO, Walter Federico. The subject-object relationship in the Kantian conception of science. Sophia [online]. 2018, n.25, pp.111-130. ISSN 1390-8626.  https://doi.org/10.17163/soph.n25.2018.03.

Our research presents the Kantian proposal of transcendental idealism as a mediating critical philosophy between the dogmatism proper to rationalism and the skepticism generated by sensualist empiricism. Our work makes a brief presentation of the forms of judgment that make up the different forms of human knowledge. It is of great importance to recognize and take into account, when studying current philosophical thought, the profound relevance that Kant has had in history and in the development of contemporary thought. We will also present the complex relationship that Kant establishes between reason in its theoretical uses and reason in its practical uses. A comparative analysis between idealism and realism is introduced, using a hermeneutic methodology and an analysis of the dialectical philosophical discourse in terms of conceptual antithesis. Finally, we propose the difference between theory and praxis in the field of science and ethics, and the need to understand scientific objectivity and ethical subjectivity as diverse forms of rigorous human knowledge.

Palabras clave : Scientific knowledge; ethics; philosophy of science; idealism; subject-object relationship.

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