Resumen

ARANGO RESTREPO, Gabriel Jaime. The theory of intention of John Searle. Sophia [online]. 2017, n.22, pp.83-102. ISSN 1390-8626.  https://doi.org/10.17163/soph.n22.2017.03.

The issue of intentionality has been the center of attention of the philosophical discussions, since it’s inception and continues to be a point of discussion today. The different explanations given in this regard have laid the foundation for the construction of philosophical systems of various types. What these systems have in common is that they use the term ‘intentionality’ in a philosophical sense, separate from the term ‘intention’ in a general sense, despite that both terms are aimed at objects voluntary acts. This use of ‘intentionality’ without the significance brought by the term ‘intention’ leads to misunderstandings, which does not permit the production of new knowledge and in order to clarify them a new concept required of the term ‘intentionality’. In this sense, the philosophy of language and mind of John Searle is very useful. By critically analyzing many of the most representative texts on Searle’s and other studies that have been done on this matter the concept of intentionality the research makes it clear that it is a feature of both the will and conscience. This paper will then touch on Searle’s theory of intentionality by moving from speech acts to mental states. Finally, it describes the constituent features of the human language, and compares it with the computer language. It concludes that intentionality, for the moment, is exclusively a concept that can be applied to human beings and it is direct relationship with language and following rules.

Palabras clave : Intentionality; speech acts; mental states; language; John Searle.

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