Abstract

TRIPOLONE, Gerardo. No Place for Military Counterintelligence in Argentina:Analysis of a Possible Legal Gap. URVIO [online]. 2020, n.26, pp.24-36. ISSN 1390-4299.  https://doi.org/10.17141/urvio.26.2020.4214.

The legislation of Argentina establishes four activities for the National Intelligence System: national intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal intelligence and, at least, military-strategic intelligence. The Direction on National Military-Strategic Intelligence (DINIEM), under the Ministry of Defense, produces the military-strategic intelligence, while the Federal Intelligence Agency produces counterintelligence. The aim of this paper is to study a legal problem that has not been addressed in literature: the lack of regulation on military counterintelligence, which has no place in the national legislation. The executive branch has decided that the DINIEM carries out at least part of the military counterintelligence activities. This decision enables a military office to carry out an intelligence task inside the State, something that stresses the legal limits of the operations of Armed Forces. The methodology of legal science is used to analyze the problem, but taking into account the historical and political context of the legislation. It is concluded that the legislation allows the executive branch to decide discretionally about the appointed office to develop military counterintelligence.

Keywords : armed forces; intelligence agency; internal security; law; military counterintelligence; national defense.

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